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Washington, D.C. 20231

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Serial Number: 08/844731
Filing Date: 4/21/97
Appellant(s): Staley A. Brod

Paper No. 11

Mailed
1700
3-28-99

Benjamin Aaron Adler

For Appellant

EXAMINER'S ANSWER

This is in response to appellant's brief on appeal filed 3/19/99.

(1) Real Party in Interest.

A statement identifying the real party is contained in the brief.

(2) Related Appeals and Interferences.

A statement identifying the related appeals and interferences

which will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the decision in the pending appeal is contained in the brief.

(3) Status of claims.

The statement of the status of claims contained in the brief is correct. Claims pending are 1-18.

(4) Status of Amendments After Final.

The appellant's statement of the status of amendments after final rejection contained in the brief is correct.

(5) Summary of invention.

The summary of invention contained in the brief is correct.

(6) Issues.

The appellant's statement of the issues in the brief is correct.

(7) Grouping of claims.

The appellant's statement in the brief that certain claims do not stand or fall together is not agreed with because although appellant has considered claims 1-18 to lie in four embodiments, claims 1-18 are not separately patentable as grouped since claims 1-7 include in their breadth each of the other

embodiments such that if claims 1-7 stand or fall so should claims 8-20. Indeed, the same may be said of claims 8-11, 12-17 and 16-18 wherein "decreasing the incidence of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus" is inter-related to "reducing blood glucose 1 decreasing the incidence of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus in at-risk populations".

(8) Claims appealed.

The copy of the appealed claims contained in the Appendix to the brief is correct.

(9) Prior Art of record.

| | | |
|------------------|---|--------|
| ✓ US 5019382 | Cummins, Jr. | 5/1991 |
| ✓ WO 9420122 | Sobel | 9/1994 |
| Shibutani et al. | Iyakuhin Kenkyu, Vol. 18(4), pages 571-582, 1987 | |
| Gross et al. | Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, vol. 111(36), pages 1351-5, 1986 | |
| Giron et al. | J. Interferon Res., Vol. 8(6), pages 745-53, 1988. | |

(10) New prior art.

No new prior art has been applied in this examiner's answer.

(11) Grounds of rejection.

1

1. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

1 "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
5 more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the
United States."

2. Claims 1-4, 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) as
9 being anticipated by Cummins, Jr. (U.S. Patent 5019382).

See col. 4, lines 19-36, col. 5, lines 50-55, col. 6, lines
12-26, col. 13, and the claims. Such disclosure meets the
claims.

13 3. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms
the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office
action:

17 A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of
this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
21 as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by
the manner in which the invention was made.
25 Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as
prior art only under subsection (f) and (g) of section 102 of this
title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where
the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the
29 invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person.

33 4. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being
unpatentable over Cummins, Jr. (U.S. Patent 5019382). The
disclosure is the same as above as discussed for claim 1.
The patent does not disclose an alternate day dosing.
37 However, it does show that a daily dosage is possible, as a
single dosage or as divided and administered in a multiple
daily dose regimen. The reference also teaches a staggered
regimen of 1-3 days per week or month as an alternative to
41 daily dosing. See col. 5, lines 50-55. With such a

1 flexibility as taught by the reference, and since it is
common knowledge in the art to employ such a regimen instead
of continuous dosing, for a variety of reasons such as,
toxicity, the condition of the patient, patient reaction and
amelioration of the disease condition, etc., it would have
5 been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to adopt an
alternate day dosing and administer IFN as shown by Cummins
for MS.

9
5. Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being
unpatentable over Cummins, Jr. (U.S. Patent 5019382) in view
of Shibutani et al. (Iyakuin Kenkyu, vol. 18(4), pp.
13 571-82, 1987) and abstracts of WO 94/20122, Gross et al. and
Giron et al.

The disclosure for the patent is as discussed above.
The whole range of dosages claimed by the instant invention
17 is not shown. However, the Shibutani abstract indicates
that IFN toxicity studies with rats showed that it was
tolerated well. Therefore it would have been obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art to administer dosages higher
21 than that shown in the patent with the reasonable
expectation that such doses would not produce toxicity
side-effects in humans. It would also have been obvious to
employ such an alternate day dose regimen instead of
25 continuous dosing, for a variety of reasons such as,
toxicity, the condition of the patient, patient reaction and
amelioration of the disease condition, etc. The references
also do not disclose the prevention or treatment of
29 diabetes. However, in view of the disclosure of the
abstracts that show that it was already known in the art at
the time the invention was made that interferon prevented
the onset of diabetes, the subject matter as a whole would

1 have been obvious to the person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was filed.

6. Claims 1-7 are provisionally rejected under 35 U.S.C.
5 § 101 as claiming the same invention as that of claims 1-7
of copending application Serial No. 08/631470. This is a
provisional double patenting rejection since the conflicting
claims have not in fact been patented.

9
A rejection based on double patenting of the "same
invention" type finds its support in the language of 35
U.S.C. 101 which states that "whoever invents or discovers
13 any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor
..." (Emphasis added). Thus, the term "same invention," in
this context, means an invention drawn to identical subject
matter. See *Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.*, 151 U.S. 186 (1894);
17 *In re Ockert*, 245 F.2d 467, 114 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1957); and *In*
re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970).

21 A statutory type (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting
rejection can be overcome by canceling or amending the
conflicting claims so they are no longer coextensive in
scope. The filing of a terminal disclaimer cannot overcome
a double patenting rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. 101.

25
7. Claims 8-18 are provisionally rejected under the
judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double
29 patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-18 of
copending application Serial No. 08/631470 in view of the
abstracts of WO 94/20122, Gross et al. and Giron et al.
Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are
33 not patentably distinct from each other because the subject
matter of these claims would have been obvious in view of
the abstracts that show that it was already known in the art
at the time the invention was made that interferon prevented

1 the onset of diabetes. [Filing date accorded to the claims
8, 12 and 16 reciting diabetes mellitus (prevention, etc.) is
4/15/96].

5 This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting
rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact
been patented.

9 8. The obviousness-type double patenting rejection is a
judicially established doctrine based upon public policy and
is primarily intended to prevent prolongation of the patent
term by prohibiting claims in a second patent not patentably
13 distinct from claims in a first patent. *In re Vogel*, 164
USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in
compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b) would overcome an
actual or provisional rejection on this ground provided the
17 conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly
owned with this application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d).

(13) Response to argument.

21 On page 9 of the brief, appellant has criticized the
Cummins reference for showing only one anecdotal report and
being "extremely limited" (see declaration submitted). He
25 argues that "this limited clinical data" cannot be
considered enabling and therefore should be held
"incredible" and therefore non-anticipatory. See page 10 of
the brief. Enablement requires that the specification teach
29 those in the art to make and use the invention without
"undue experimentation". *In re Wands*, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8
USPQ2d 140, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The specification and
data therein is considered to be adequate to provide the
33 skilled worker enough to practice the invention without
"undue experimentation". A patent cannot be called "non-
enabling" because appellant has produced data from 27
patients and 18 controls versus the one example in the

1 patent used. See MPEP §2164.02.

As for amounts discussed at page 16 of the brief, the claims rejected under 35 USC 102 do not contain the limitation that appellant has based his arguments on (SEE page 7, lines 1-2 of the response) and as for claim 11 note that the claim is anticipated by Cummins Jr. showing 5 I.U./kg which overlaps with the end point of the claimed range.

9 Appellant's discussion of Cummins' mode of administration at pages 15 and 17+ of the response is also not persuasive. There is nothing clearly distinguishable between "orally administering...such that the ...interferon is ingested after oral administration" (see claim 1) and Cummins' mode. Appellant has argued at page 15 that in his specification the interferon was fed through a needle inserted into the stomach and there was no oral or pharyngeal contact. There are no such limitations in the claims, however, and the relevance of this argument in view of the instantly claimed limitations and claim recitation is not clear. Appellant cannot rely on the specification to impart to the claims limitations not recited therein. Such a reliance is ineffective to define over the prior art. In *re Lundberg*, 244 F2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957), *In re Winkhaus*, 188 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1975). See also *In re Hyson*, 172 USPQ 399, *In re Tiffin*, 171 USPQ 294, *In re Lindner*, 173 USPQ 356: It is well established that the objective evidence of nonobviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims.

29 Appellant also argues that there was only "brief" exposure of interferon to the oral mucosa in his method. The claims herein do not recite anything to this end and there is no recitation or disclosure to show such a "brief"

1 exposure only. Appellant states on page 15, last 2
sentences that the claims state that the interferon is to be
3 ingested upon oral administration and that the interferon is
only in contact with the oral mucosa during the swallowing
5 process, which takes a fairly brief period of time. It is
obvious to the artisan from the reference that even in
Cummin's mode a small or considerable amount of interferon
will be eventually ingested as a normal course of events.
9 The feature of mode of administration urged by appellant as
distinguishing enough to be the basis of patentability, is
not clear and convincing or of patentable moment, based on
the disclosure and claim language.

13 Appellant's pointing out col. 5, lines 50-55 of Cummins
is also unpersuasive. The patent clearly teaches "Daily
dosage of interferon....as a single dosage". Nowhere in any
statute is there a requirement that only the preferred
17 embodiment of the reference should be considered a teaching
and the rest of the reference be ignored. See *In re Uhlig*,
153 USPQ 460, *In re Mills*, 176 USPQ 196 (CCPA 1972)

21 Both the traversal of the rejection over claim 5 and
the declaration have been carefully reviewed and considered
and the above discussions apply here too.

25 Appellant's traversal of the rejection of claims 1-18
at page 20 is in error. Test for combining references is
not what individual references themselves suggest but what
the combination of disclosures taken as a whole would
suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. *In re*
McLaughlin, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1970). Appellant has
29 improperly criticized the references individually where the
rejection is based upon the combined teachings of the
references. *In re Merck., Inc.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 1097, 231
USPQ 375, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986); *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413,

1 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981). Unobviousness cannot be
established by attacking references taken individually when
rejection is based on a combination of references. *Ex parte*
5 *Campbell* 172 USPQ 91 (BPA&I 1971). Note that Shibutani's
abstract is used to show toxicity studies only and the
motivation it provides to the artisan to do what appellant
has done. Similarly, Gross et al and Giron et al
9 references show that the art was well aware that interferon
could be administered to diabetic subjects without side-
effects due to toxicity. Such secondary references provide
motivation when taken together with Cummins Jr.

13 Appellant's response to the double patenting and
obviousness type double patenting rejections have been noted
at page 25 of the brief and those rejections are being
maintained as proper and valid. Appellant's response to the
17 Sequence listing requirement is also being maintained until
disposition of this case, although it is recognized that
this is not appealable subject matter.

21 For the above reasons, it is believed that the
rejections should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

25
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